
#387 Can Potential Vertical Integration Harm Be (Silver) Screened Horizontally?
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Vertical merger review has long rested on the principle that competitive harm is most likely when a merged firm has both the ability and incentive to foreclose rivals, yet courts and enforcers often struggle to establish that harm empirically. But can potentially anticompetitive vertical integrations be screened in advance using observable market characteristics? Charles Hodgson, Assistant Professor of Economics at Yale University and Faculty Research Fellow at the NBER, and Shilong Sun, Senior Economist at Compass Lexecon, join Anora Wang and Panos Dimitrellos to discuss how evidence from the Chinese film industry sheds light on when vertical foreclosure is likely to emerge, why downstream…